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Summary
The research studies the prospects of privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises and attracting foreign investment, considering both 
domestic and international factors as of November 2008. The 
financial crisis has spread over the real sector of economy in the 
region, which makes the framework for the functioning of 
Belarusian economy. It has caused the Belarusian government to 
make a considerable change of plan in the field.
The government has far-reaching plans to turn Belarusian 
enterprises into joint-stock companies with a view to selling a 
share of state property to foreign investors. Yet, they are highly 
unlikely to be completely fulfilled by the appointed time. However, 
the growing shortage of foreign currency on the domestic financial 
market is going to give the government additional motivation for 
fast privatisation of big enterprises. On the other hand, due to the 
shortage of financial resources in the region, potential investors 
are likely to become less interested in Belarusian enterprises. For 
these reasons, as well as considering certain institutional factors, 
in the nearest future privatisation will mainly go along the lines of 
direct agreements with the Presidential Administration and the 
government. It will generally involve banking and those 
enterprises which either dominate the whole economic sectors or 
have a potential to do so.
1. Introduction
BISS has more than once analysed the privatisation processes in Belarus and their 
prospects. BISS experts agree with most of their colleagues in Belarus and abroad that 
privatisation is such a tool to maintain social and economic stability that the Belarusian 
government will not resort to unless others are unavailable or inefficient. We supposed 
that in 2007 – 2008 the country would see ‘single-point’ privatisation of state property, 
which would not cause any structural friction within the current economic model.
It turned out a well-grounded prognosis. For the past two years, apart from Beltransgaz, 
the government has sold its shares in Velcom and BEST mobile phone operators, some 
minor banks, including the MTB, BNB, Mezhtorgbank and Paritetbank, as well as 
Motovelozavod bike-producing plant and some breweries, acquired by Heineken.
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At the same time, the government has been ‘preparing Belarus for sale’. Official 
propaganda mouthpieces have changed their information policies on privatisation and the 
legislature has been amended. Large-scale privatisation plans (by Belarusian standards) 
have been made public and the government has made lists of enterprises to be privatised 
in 2008 – 2010. The lists include 519 state-owned enterprises, of which 176 were to be 
sold in 2008. However, by 1 November 2008, only one of them has been actually sold.
In other words, there may be plans for privatisation and some preparation work may well 
have been completed, but neither the government nor the enterprises’ chief executives 
speed up the process. Instead, they prefer to rely on other tools, such as ‘a privatisation 
and loan cocktail’ (Kirył Hajduk’s definition), in order to maintain social and economic 
stability and keep the socio-economic relations unchanged. So far, the state of the 
market has not required fast action from the government.
However, such factors as the global financial meltdown, negative tendencies on the 
major markets for Belarusian products, the increase in the adverse balance, as well as 
loans becoming less available will certainly push the government to take more drastic 
action. In what way are the new challenges going to influence the privatisation process? 
What course of action seems the most practical and most probable?
To answer these questions, the research gives an overview of steps already taken 
towards privatisation and the plans that the government has made public. We also 
highlight the current privatisation rules and analyse the stimuli and obstacles to 
privatisation of state property. The paper also studies the impact of the above-mentioned 
factors on the most likely privatisation deals.
The conclusion contains some recommendations that can be used both by investors, 
Belarus’s international partners and the government.
2. Preparing the Legislative Framework
The BISS report points out that since 2007 the Belarusian government has changed its 
attitude to foreign investment in the form of both new businesses and classical 
privatisation. In 1996 – 2006 privatisation in Belarus was restricted to a sluggish 
process, which resulted in enterprises formally being reorganised into joint-stock 
companies, with the state as their main shareholder. (For example, in 2006 – 2007 less 
than 6 enterprises per year became joint-stock companies, with the state possessing 
99.99 per cent of their shares.) In 2007, however, some rather important transactions 
took place, to bring about $1.5 billion in budget revenues. Among them are selling 
Beltransgaz to Russian Gazprom ($625 m annually in 2007 – 2010), Velcom mobile 
phone operator ($650 m) and a number of minor banks. All the transactions were 
marked by lack of transparency and depended on the President’s unilateral decisions.
This year the banking sector and telecommunications have taken the lead in privatisation 
deals. Here it is worth mentioning Golden Taler, VTB, the increase in Raiffeisen’s share 
and BEST. At the same time, the country’s authorities have prepared a legislative 
framework for more profound large-scale privatisation. The government has made a list 
of 198 enterprises to be reorganised into joint-stock companies by 2010 and worked out
reorganisation procedure with a view to selling the shares owned by the state.
Here are the most noticeable changes in the legislative framework, intended at 
privatisation and liberalisation of the investment climate:
 amendments to the registration procedure for businesses (Decree No. 8 of 17 
December 2007);
 abolition of the so-called ‘golden share’ (Decree No. 144 of 4 March 2008);
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 gradual withdrawal of the moratorium on the circulation of shares acquired during the 
privileged privatisation (Decree No. 7 of 14 April 2008);
 tax cuts on shares and bonds transaction income (Decree No. 5 of 20 March 2008);
 regulations on issuing corporate bonds and their transactions (Decree No. 194 of 2 
April 2008);
 amendments to the limited liability companies’ share-buying procedures for emitters 
and insiders (Ministry of Finance Resolution No. 133 of 29 September 2008);
 specifying the preferential terms of sale of unprofitable enterprises (Decree No. 113 
of 25 February 2008);
 setting quarterly deadlines for paying a number of taxes (Decree No. 145 of 6 March 
2008);
 partial price-control liberalisation (Decree No. 694 of 30 December 2007, 
Government’s Resolution No. 252);
 specifying the sales procedure for unused property (Government’s Resolution No. 605 
of 24 April 2008);
 specifying the land privatisation procedure (Decree No. 667 of 27 December 2007 
and Government’s Resolution No. 462 of 26 March 2008);
 making the list of state-owned enterprises to be privatised (Government’s Resolution 
No. 1021 of 14 July 2008); 
 increasing the foreign capital quota in banking from 25 to 50 per cent (Resolution No. 
129 of the National Bank Board of 1 September 2008).
A more detailed account of documents on privatisation passed up to July 2008 is 
available at: Privatisation in the Republic of Belarus: Basic Changes Monitoring (January 
– June 2008):
Although the work that has been done in this direction can hardly be called all-
embracing, it proves that the process is very likely to become irreversible. After all, it is 
engaging more and more state institutions and the emerging groups interested in the 
privatisation process are strengthening their lobbying potential.
At the same time, most of the privatisation and economic liberalisation amendments 
were made at the end of 2007 and early in 2008. During the last six months of 2008 the 
country’s authorities have been mainly specifying the procedures of reorganising the 
enterprises to be privatised into joint-stock companies, working out privatisation 
mechanisms and negotiating with potential investors.
The state institutions view the programme of reorganising the enterprises into joint-stock 
companies as a tool to strengthen the state’s standing in negotiations with potential 
investors and a way to speed up clinching the deals. However, at present it can hardly be 
claimed that privatisation is going fast enough. Thus, by November 2008 only one 
enterprise from the privatisation list (Arančycy Poultry Factory in Brest region, to be 
exact) has been reorganised into a joint-stock company. Still, 148 out of the 176 
enterprises have set up ‘reorganising commissions’ and 163 of them have taken a 
decision to be reorganised into joint-stock companies.
In other words, it is evident that the reorganisation and privatisation plan will not be 
completely fulfilled by the fixed date. There are strong grounds for that, and we are 
going to dwell on them in Part 4. However, this is not to say that privatisation is not 
going to take place at all. We should bear in mind that the property structure in Belarus 
has been gradually changing for the past two years. This is most vividly proved by the 
National Bank’s resolution of 1 September 2008 on increasing the foreign capital quota in 
banking from 25 to 50 per cent.
3. The 2007 – 2008 Privatisation Deals
Within the given period privatisation deals were concluded through a) selling the state’s 
share in banks and some real economy enterprises and b) foreign investors joining in the 
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existing private companies. The second type of transactions was more common. It is the 
financial sector that was in the lead in both the types.
Here are the most noticeable deals of 2007 – 2008:
Banking
 53.6% of Slavneftebank sold to Russian VTB Bank, Slavneftebank renamed as VTB 
Bank;
 48.5% of the state’s share in Belvniesheconombank sold to Russian 
Vniesheconombank. The Russian bank also bought shares from other stockholders 
and increased its share of Belvniesheconombank to 92.3%;
 38.94% of the state’s share in Belarusian Mezhtorgbank sold to ABH Ukraine Ltd 
management company (Cyprus), which is a subsidiary of Alphabank Ukraine Inc. 
Through buying other stockholders’ shares the Russian Alpha Group has consolidated 
88.045% of the bank’s shares;
 The Northern Investment Bank’s control share sold to Ximex Co. (UK). The Northern 
Investment Bank Inc. was renamed as Credexbank Inc.;
 99.999% of Atom-Bank Inc. sold to a Ukrainian strategic investor. Atom-Bank Inc. 
was renamed as Delta Bank Inc.
 83% of the International Reserve Bank sold to Dogmat Group;
 75% of SOMbelbank Inc. sold to Getin Holding S.A. Group (Poland);
 100% of Lorobank sold to Home Credit Group. Lorobank was renamed as HCBank;
 31.5% of Minsk Transit Bank sold to Monitor Investments Ltd, which is a branch of 
Horizon Capital investment fund (USA);
 66% of the Belarusian AstanaEximBank sold to the Kazakh TuranAlem BTA Bank. 
AstanaEximBank renamed as BTA Bank. The Kazakh investor’s share then increased 
to 99.29%;
 70% of the Belarusian People’s Bank (BNB) sold to the Bank of Georgia;
 Both Gazprom and Gazprombank have increased their shares in Belgazprombank 
from 42.73% to 48% each;
 Raiffeisen Group (Austria) has increased its share in Belarusian Priorbank to 81.41%.
Due to these transactions on 1 August 2008 22 of the 28 banks had foreign capital in 
their authorised capital stock. 16 of them had over 50% of foreign investment in their 
authorised capital stock. According to Head of Banking Supervision Department Siarhiej 
Dubkou, early in October 2008 the share of foreign capital in the Belarusian banks’ 
aggregate authorised capital stock made 22.2%, as compared to 17.1% on 1 August 
2008, 9.84% on 1 January 2008 and 7.84% on 1 January 2007.
Real Economy
 50% of the state’s share in Beltransgaz sold to Gazprom (the overall sum of $2.5 
billion is to be paid in equal instalments during a period of four years);
 99.72% of the state’s share in Motovelozavod sold to ATEC Holding GmbH (Austria);
 the state’s share in Hasteła Experimental Plant joint-stock company sold to the 
Belarusian Amkodor joint-stock company;
 83.64% of the state’s share in Krasny Oktyabr joint-stock company sold to 
Belarusian-German company San Marko;
 100% of Detroit Investments Ltd (Cyprus), which owned Siabar brewery in Babrujsk, 
bought by Heineken;
 51% of Rečycapiva brewery bought by Heineken.
Infrastructure and Communications
 80% of the state’s and state enterprises’ share in BEST sold to Turkish Turkcell.
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All in all, according to the State Property Committee, by the beginning of October 2008 
the special national development fund of the country’s budget received 5.691 billion 
Belarusian roubles and $1.125 billion from selling the state’s shares in different 
companies.
4. Privatisation Rules
The alienation of the state-owned enterprises and buildings (except dwelling houses) 
worth over 10,000 base units (1 base unit= BR35,000=$16.6, so 10,000 base units 
make $166,000), machinery, equipment and vehicles worth over 10,000 base units as 
well as shares in companies can only take place on the President’s decision.
The approbation procedure for selling the shares of joint-stock companies organised 
within the framework of privatisation of state property, which are to be sold in 2008 –
2010, looks as follows.
The joint-stock company takes a decision on the per cent of shares to be sold and the 
selling mechanism (a tender, auction, etc.). The decision needs to be approved by the 
surveillance body that administers the shares (as a rule, it is the Ministry in charge of a 
given branch of industry). If necessary, the surveillance body amends the joint-stock 
company’s propositions on both the per cent of shares and the selling mechanism and 
submits the information to the State Property Committee.
The State Property Committee, which owns and commands the shares, in this capacity 
drafts up the presidential resolution on selling the shares and submits it to the 
Government to be approved of and further submitted to the Presidential Administration. 
Once the President has taken his decision and the shares have been valued, the State 
Property Committee holds an auction or a tender to sell the shares.
A potential investor’s proposition on buying a block of shares can be addressed either to 
the joint-stock company itself or to any of the state institutions engaged in privatisation.
At present the state institutions are drafting their proposals towards raising the 
Government’s and the State Property Committee’s competence in state property 
management. In particular, they are discussing a possibility of raising the minimal value 
of real estate to be alienated on the President’s decision only from the today’s 10,000 
base units to 1 m base units, i.e. $16.6 m.
Selling the Shares to an Investor Directly
The state sells the most important enterprises through direct negotiations with potential 
investors, which result in a block of shares being sold at the negotiated price. For 
example, this is how 50% of Beltransgaz was sold to Gazprom and a share in BEST was 
sold to Turkcell. Bilateral negotiations are supposed to determine all the terms, ranging 
from the percentage of shares to be sold to the investor’s obligations concerning the 
development of the acquired assets and deadlines for these obligations, etc.
Putting Shares out to Tender
The factors to be considered are the price offered for the shares, the terms of 
contributing assets towards the development of the joint-stock company or other 
additional terms. If the winner acquires more than 50% of shares in the authorised 
capital, additional terms may be put forward. These may refer to maintaining and/or 
creating a certain number of jobs, keeping the assortment of goods and services, 
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carrying out or participating in eco-friendly measures, maintaining the enterprise’s 
specialisation, preserving the existing labour safety system, maintaining and investing in 
social facilities (kindergartens, children’s camps, health resorts, etc.) owned by the joint-
stock company or used on a free basis for a fixed period, etc.
An Auction Sale
In an auction, a joint-stock company’s shares are sold in a single lot or several lots. The 
one who bids the highest price for each lot is recognised as the winner. Following the 
auction, the State Property Committee concludes a purchase contract with the winner 
within ten days since the auction.
The Investor Joining In the Founders at the Transformation Stage
The Belarusian law has a provision that the state represented by its authorised institution 
shall be the founder of a joint-stock company transformed from a state-owned unitary 
enterprise. The transformation procedure includes a number of stages, such as holding a 
general meeting of the staff to take a decision on initiating the transformation into a 
joint-stock company, drafting a project to establish a joint-stock company, getting an 
approval from a number of state institutions and making a decision on the transformation 
into a joint-stock company.
At the stage of the general staff meeting a potential investor can join in the founders 
alongside the state.
This method has a number of advantages as compared to buying the shares of a newly-
established joint-stock company, as it enables the investor to get much more information 
on the state of things at the transformed enterprise and avoid the risk of clashing with 
unwanted competitors in an auction or tender. However, the State Property Committee 
high-ranking officials object to a large-scale implementation of this scheme. Their 
reasoning is that in this case the state is put at disadvantage, since the funds contributed 
by the investor are controlled by the company.
Emission of New Shares
Increasing the authorised capital stock by attracting investors’ funds through emission of 
new shares to be placed with investors is another way of attracting investment into joint-
stock companies set up within the framework of privatisation.
In fact attracting an investor to an already established joint-stock company means a 
‘double’ increase in its authorised capital stock. Before taking a decision to seek the 
authorised state institution’s approval of the emission of new shares, the enterprise 
makes a decision to increase its authorised capital through its internal resources, i.e. by 
emitting new shares or changing the par value of the shares.
Alienation of Other State Property Apart From Shares In an Auction or Tender
In addition, the Law on Privatisation provides for alienation of other state property apart 
from shares in an auction or tender. This refers to enterprises as property complexes, 
buildings and equipment, etc. Property worth over 10,000 basic units ($166,000) can be 
alienated only after the President’s decision.
Among others, there is a type of auction in which the initial price goes down until one of 
the participants is ready to buy the lot.
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Presidential Decree No. 113 of 25 February 2008 determines how the initial price of 
alienated enterprises should be established. The decree is valid for permanently insolvent 
unitary enterprises having unsatisfactory fiscal health and poor performance. Their initial 
price can make one base unit only, i.e. BR35,000, which is equivalent to $16.6. The list 
of such enterprises is drawn up, approved of and authorised on an annual basis.
5. Stimuli to Privatisation
IPM expert Alena Rakava is right in arguing that reforms in Belarus have always 
been forced by changes in the international environment. The changes in the 
basic principles of Belarus – Russian energy supplies trade as of 2007 provided 
an impetus for some liberalisation of economy-related laws and embarking on 
privatisation.
Here are some factors that cause the government to give away state property:
Table 1. Foreign trade deficit, $ m
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
exports 4803 7326 7451 8021 9946 13774 15979 42085 24275 26720
imports 5564 8646 8286 9092 11558 16491 16708 19734 28693 30801
balance -761 -
1320
-835 -
1071
-1612 -2717 -729 22351 -4418 -4081
Trade 
with 
Russia
-780 -
1895
-
1475
-
1945
-2722 -4734 -4402 -6254 -8326 -
10622
* January – September 2008 
Source: http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/indicators/ftrade.php
Table 2. Trade Balance Deficit, $ m
January – June 2007 January – June 2008 Growth, %
Current 
transactions 
account
-1,173.5 -1,410.5 20.2
Source: http://www.nbrb.by/statistics/BalPayBelarus/index.asp
Table 3. Belarus – Russia Trade Deficit, $ m
January – June 2007 January – June 2008 Growth, %
Current 
transactions 
account
- 3,324.8 -6,795.3 104.4
Source: http://www.nbrb.by/statistics/BalPayBelRus/
Table 4. Aggregate Foreign Debt Growth, $ m
01/01/2008 01/04/2008 01/07/2008
Aggregate foreign debt 12,493.5 13,699.9 14,115.6
Source: http://www.nbrb.by/statistics/ExternalDebt/
Experts point out that it is the hike in debt growth rate rather than the amount of debt 
that causes great anxiety. It is more evident if we consider a longer period, 2003 – 2008.
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Table 5. Increase in foreign debt, $ m
01/01/2004 01/01/2005 01/01/2006 01/01/2007 01/01/2008 01/07/2008
Aggregate 
foreign 
debt
4,174.9 4,935.4 5,128.2 6,844.1 12,493.5 14.116
Inefficient fund management, when loans are used to support enterprises showing 
poor performance.
As the global financial meltdown is spreading over Central and Eastern Europe, it adds up 
to the factors that force the government to give away state property.
Capital drain in September – October
In September 2008 the banking sphere saw a net capital drain of $420,5 m. Non-
residents withdrew only $17.6 m from Belarusian banks, whereas the banks themselves 
increased their investment into foreign assets by $402.9 m, which means that foreign 
banks were financed by their subsidiaries.
Tension on the Money Market
Late in October the interest rate in Belarusian roubles on the interbank credit market 
went up to 18 – 19 per cent. This entailed a rise in the interest on personal loans in 
foreign currency up to 18 – 20 per cent during the last week of October, as compared to 
12.8 – 13.7 per cent in September. The interests on business loans made 14 – 16 per 
cent, as compared to 10.6 – 10.9 per cent in September.
Under these conditions, banks have begun to limit their crediting activities, for example, 
by curtailing the maximal amount of a personal loan.
In addition, foreign currency shortage at exchange offices is becoming more and more 
widely felt, whereas people are getting more and more interested in buying foreign 
currency.
A Fall in Belarusian Enterprises’ Hard Currency Revenues
The crisis on the major markets for Belarusian products has caused a fall in Belarusian 
exports. There is information that Russian and Ukrainian buyers are withdrawing their 
2008 orders, mainly for products of the Belarusian machine-building enterprises, such as 
Minsk Automobile Works, Minsk Tractor Works and BelAZ.
On the one hand, the fall in the enterprises’ hard currency revenues undermines the 
National Bank’s efforts to stabilise the exchange rate for the Belarusian rouble; on the 
other, it results in the enterprises’ floating assets deficit.
Production Slowdown 
This entails a fall in production output at Belarusian enterprises. In September it 
decreased by 7.4 per cent as compared to August.
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The following statistics can give an idea of the major problem areas in production: dried 
unskimmed milk –44.9%, washing machines –39.5%, buses –32.5%, trams –25%, 
compression-type machines –24%, black oil –19.5%, wallpaper –16.1%, loaders –
13.3%, bearings –13.2%, bicycles –9.2%, electric motors –8.1%, motorcycles –6.5%, 
wall materials –6%, tyres –5.4%, fertilisers –4.1%.
Investment Programmes Curtailment
The deficit in funds and high interest rates may have a negative impact on investment 
into fixed capital. Faced with the crisis, businesses may suspend their investment plans 
until things change for the better. It should be remembered that investment and 
consumer demand still remain the main factors driving economic growth in Belarus. 
Thus, the production slowdown, which is sure to have its negative influence on the GDP 
growth, could be further aggravated by the investment programmes curtailment.
The Fall in Oil Prices
The fall in oil prices is among major exogenous factors that could worsen Belarus’s 
economic standing. If Belarus fails to persuade Russia to reconsider oil and gas trade 
terms enacted in 2007, it will lead to the price gap for Belarus and the rest of the region 
being narrowed. In its turn, in will make Belarusian products less competitive, which will 
also contribute to the fall in Belarusian exports. Moreover, the fall in oil prices below $84 
per barrel (according to IPM) will result in the country’s oil and petrochemicals trade 
balance going in the red.
All this makes the Belarusian government take urgent action to stabilise the economy. 
Belarus has asked for a stand-by loan of $2 billion from the Russian government, which 
has already been granted. Its first instalment is to be transferred in November. The 
country has also applied to the IMF for another $2 billion loan.
In order to encourage enterprises to use credit loans, the government is going to make 
opening a credit tranche in the exporting country a prerequisite for buying imported 
equipment. Other purchases of imported machinery and equipment are going to be 
ceased.
The Ministry of Economy has set the critical figure of foreign debt at 50% of the GDP (at 
present it makes about 24% of the GDP).
The National Bank’s efforts are aimed at stabilising the exchange rate for the Belarusian 
rouble so that people’s trust in the banking system is not undermined. The presidential 
decree on guarantees on personal deposits and the National Bank’s restrictions on 
commercial banks concerning their management of personal deposits pursue the same 
goal. Another presidential decree on simplifying the procedure of placing deposits is also 
supposed to attract extra funds to the banking sphere.
It is evident that these measures will not be enough. According to some experts’ 
estimates, the unstable export situation requires a financial ‘cushion’ equivalent to three 
months’ exports, which amounts to $8–9 billion.
In all probability, the Belarusian government will do its best to obtain the Russian 
government’s support concerning leasing, state orders and other schemes for purchasing 
Belarusian products. Yet, even if the Belarusian government succeeds in doing so, it will 
only stabilise the national economy but the modernisation problem will remain unsolved.
Thus, the global financial meltdown stimulates the Belarusian government to speed up 
privatisation processes.
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6. Obstacles to Privatisation
At the same time, there are obstacles to privatisation. It can be argued that the country’s 
leaders were too late to come up with their proposals on the international markets, as 
the situation has recently changed drastically. Here are some recent tendencies that 
impede looking for buyers of Belarusian state property.
Loans Becoming Less Available
The global financial meltdown has resulted in money becoming more expensive on the 
international markets, as well as investors doubting what to put it in. On 10 October, 
Libor interest rates went up to 4.82 per cent on three-month loans and about 7 per cent 
on long-term loans. By 5 November, they had fallen again up to 2.51 per cent. According 
to Goldman Sachs Group chief economist Ian Gatsius, banks are cutting their 
expenditures, economy is in recession, so it is unlikely that banks will become more 
willing to give loans to each other in the near future.
Investors Losing Their Interest in Developing Markets
We are observing capital drain from the developing markets, i.e. from the periphery to 
the centre (the US). Investors have lost their trust in the developing markets. Moreover, 
experts predict a fall in European companies’ profits, so it will be more difficult to find 
prospective buyers, interested in investing into developing markets. For example, in 
September investments in Ukrainian economy dwindled by one-third. As for the foreign 
investment banks’ plans to enter the Belarusian market, according to UNITER Co., they 
have been put off indefinitely. Among the banks that showed their interest in doing 
business in Belarus, were ING, Barclays Bank and UniCredit, as well as US-based 
Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch, etc.
Investment Funds Deficit in Russia
In their turn, Russian companies are having problems with investment resources. Firstly, 
they have to seek funds for investment programmes they have already launched. 
Secondly, due to the general recession their profits have dwindled.
As a result, Russian partners today are less interested in Belarusian assets. 
Belarus’s Credit Rating Going Down
Standard & Poor’s International Rating Agency has brought down its prognosis for 
Belarus’s credit rating from ‘stable’ to ‘negative’. At the same time, it has confirmed its 
B+ rating for foreign currency, BB for long-term loans and B for short-term loans in 
Belarusian roubles.
‘Belarus’s rating change reflects the negative impact of the international economic and 
fiscal environment on the country’s economy,’ says its press-release. ‘Considerable 
deterioration in the trade conditions combined with a fall in demand from key trade
partners will increase pressure on the current account balance accompanied by limited 
access to external financial resources and limited cushion due to low external liquidity.’
Inner Institutional Limitations
In addition, there are a number of serious reasons which demotivate state officials in 
charge of fulfilling the privatisation plan from keeping up with the rate set by the 
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government. Firstly, the officials are under the pressure of the so-called ‘forecast plan’, 
which means that they are held personally responsible for meeting ‘forecast indicators’. 
In most cases transformation into a joint-stock company and selling the state’s shares 
entail a failure to meet the major forecast indicators, such as output growth, maintaining 
the number of jobs and contributing to local budgets. This is particularly true of 
inefficient enterprises. Secondly, transformation into a joint-stock company requires 
extra funds, which cannot be allocated so easily, considering the working capital deficit. 
After all, the preparation of privatisation documents costs $2,000 – 50,000 in the 2007 
prices. And the last but not the least, executives of state enterprises can rely on 
deferment of payments, privileged loans and other preferences. 
The transformation and privatisation procedures seem to be oriented towards the state’s 
hypercontrol both in stock-taking, property evaluation, preparing the required documents 
(only a limited number of companies are allowed to do this) and weighing up investment 
proposals. It all seems to be aimed at dealing with investors ‘on an individual basis’.
The main inner limitations affect Belarus’s international ratings, including the World 
Bank’s annual ‘doing business’ rating. It may be true that in the 2008 rating Belarus has 
moved to the 85th position due to the legislative initiatives covered in Part 2. But under 
the conditions of growing risks throughout the region, such estimates of the country’s 
business-climate do not seem highly attractive for investors.
Table 6. Doing Business Ratings for Belarus
2005 Rating 2006 Rating 2008 Rating
Starting a 
business
153 148 97
Licensing 88 84
Hiring workforce 36 31 49
Property 
registration
91 96 14
Obtaining a loan 76 117 109
Protection of 
investors’ interests
141 142 104
Tax paying 175 175 181
Doing foreign 
trade
106 113 134
Fulfilling contracts 36 36 14
Liquidating a 
company
97 91 71
Overall rating 124 129 85
Source: World Bank (2007). Doing Business. How to Reform.
http://www.doingbusiness.org
7. Conclusion
Thus, on the one hand, the government is demonstrating certain willingness to privatise 
state property and privatisation process is gaining some impetus, while economic activity 
in general is experiencing a degree of liberalisation, combined with an urgent need for 
funds to stabilise the economy. On the other hand, there are significant limitations to 
large-scale privatisation due to a drastic change in the external conditions and some 
inner institutional hindrances. However, in some cases these may facilitate privatisation 
deals on agreement rather than be an obstacle.
For example:
1. As BPN-2 evidently has to be cancelled or put off, it increases the chances of the 
Belarusian pipelines to Russian companies. In this respect it should be mentioned that:
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- Transneft’s actual financial condition prevents it from carrying out two simultaneous 
projects, such as Eastern Siberia – The Pacific Ocean (ESPO) and BPN-2. ESPO is now 
being financed on credit. The company has limited access to loans and credit resources. 
(http://rosfincom.ru/market/34530.html;
http://stock.rbc.ru/demo/micex.5/daily/TRNFP.rus.shtml?show=6M;
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/11/07/167779)
- late in October Transneft and the Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation (CNPC) 
signed an agreement on the basic principles of Skovorodino – the CPR border pipeline 
construction and exploitation, which means that the opponents of the company’s present 
chief executive V. Tokarev won in the lobbying confrontation. The Russian government 
has not authorised BPN-2 project so far. 
- Homieltransneft Druzhba is on the 2008 privatisation list.
- On 31 October it got a new chief executive, which may be regarded as an indirect proof 
that the government is prepared to sell this asset. (It should be mentioned that changing 
the chief executive before selling an enterprise has become a rather common practice.)
- Belarus will benefit from the sale, as it will put off indefinitely BPN-2, if not bury it 
altogether forever. Considering the fall in oil production in Russia and ESPO construction, 
there may not be enough oil for BPN-2. This guarantees the transportation of Russian oil 
along the southern Belarusian Druzhba line for years ahead (ten years at least). The 
definitely high share of the Belarusian route in Russian oil transit to Europe strengthens 
Belarus’s position in Belarus – Russia negotiations on the terms of oil trade. 
Consequently, it increases the chances of extending the oil price gap for Belarus and the 
rest of the region over a long period of time, which makes the Belarusian oil refineries 
look more attractive for investors. Moreover, co-ownership of the pipeline makes it safer 
and improves its modernisation prospects.
- In a way, the deal seems to be also beneficial for the EU countries, especially oil-
transporting ones (except for Ukraine, as it actually leaves no chance of Odessa – Brody 
pipeline functioning in the direct mode). Since Russian companies are not going to have 
excessive transit capacities, they will be unable to make the transit countries practice 
dumping in order to get Russian transit.
- On certain conditions (e.g. payment by instalments) Transneft could agree to this deal, 
as such an asset may have a positive impact on the company’s capitalisation. Perhaps 
Rosneft might be even more interested in this deal. 
2. The same refers to the prospects of the construction of the second Yamal – Europe line 
and the North European Gas Pipeline, even if to a lesser extent. Here the potential 
partners could be Polish and German companies. By and large, infrastructure investment 
projects with a view to increasing Russia’s export capacities may well find motivated 
partners.
3. Presidential Decree 22, which guarantees that personal deposits should be completely 
secure, makes Belarusian banks more attractive for investors, considerably diminishing 
their risks. Protected by such a guarantee, the banks have fewer reasons to fear the 
consequences of credit squandering due to investing in state programmes. Meanwhile, 
the gap between lending rates on the international and domestic markets gives new 
owners a good chance to make a profit.
4. In addition, it is possible that some real economy enterprises will be sold, especially if 
the enterprise in fact goes together with its market sector. As the Belarusian government 
brings up more and more protectionist barriers against imports as the main tool to 
combat the adverse balance, this is going to refer to more and more enterprises.
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8. Main Findings and Recommendations
Privatisation in Belarus is certain to be continued. In general these will still be direct 
deals on agreement with state institutions, their rank in the state hierarchy depending on 
the importance of the enterprise to be acquired.
In most of these deals, the enterprises’ chief executives (and perhaps state officials 
supervising the deal) will be changed either just before striking the deal or immediately 
after. In any case, this is something that both the enterprises’ management and 
investors should be prepared to.
Acquisition of a share in the company or even taking it over does not free it from either 
its duty to meet the ‘forecast goals’ or the government’s and local authorities’ 
‘recommendations’ or pricing regulations, etc. By and large, it can be argued that a new 
owner is only entitled to his share in profits, if any, but he will have to co-ordinate the 
company’s economic policy with the state policies and their vision by different office-
holders.
Some investors may find these terms quite attractive, particularly concerning enterprises 
firmly controlling their market sector, infrastructure or low risks.
‘Single-point privatisation’ may help the government stabilise the fiscal system at some 
critical points, giving a time-lag for efforts aimed at making the economy more attractive 
for potential investors. The goal may seem difficult to achieve, but it is an absolute 
necessity. Belarus is not the only country experiencing certain hardships due to the 
global financial meltdown. In comparison with others, it may even in some ways turn the 
situation to its advantage.
